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Abstract. The novelty of this article is the comparative analysis of the Romanian and Icelandic banking 
systems. The study results reveal that despite the fact that Romania and Iceland are two different worlds, 
there are several similarities between the banking systems of these countries. They include a late 
development of banking systems, foreigners contributing a great deal to the development of the banking 
systems in the early stage of evolution. After the Second World War until the 1990s specialized banks 
operated in both countries. The banking systems of both countries prior to the 1990s were dominated by 
politics. Liberalization of banking and capital occurred both in Romania and Iceland after 1990; the bank 
privatization process took place during a similar period (1999-2006, Romania; 1998-2002, Iceland). Before 
privatization, banks in both countries lacked experience in a new banking “arena”. The global financial crisis 
greatly affected the two banking systems. Despite similarities, the evolution of the two banking systems was 
also marked by differences, notably the ownership origin of banks after privatization (foreign dominance in 
Romania; domestic owners in Iceland) and different business models developed by banks in the pre-crisis 
period.       
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1. Introduction 
Starting from the important role that banking systems in the two countries have in financial 
intermediation, we structure the paper in three sections.  
The first section is devoted to geographically and historically landmarks of Romania and Iceland. In the 
second section, we present the main stages in the development of banking systems in the two countries. In 
that presentation, we emphasize the differences between before and after 1990. This delimitation takes 
into account the fact that the Romanian banking and financial system started to develop on a modern base 
after 1990 and the Icelandic financial system began transforming rapidly during the 1990s.  
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Another point of reference in presenting the two banking systems was the global financial crisis, 
pointing to the banking expansion in the pre-crisis period, the impact of the crisis and further 
developments. 
We compare in the third section the two banking systems. Our discussions highlight the similarities and 
differences between them. 
Over the time, due to the importance of banking system, the specialty literature in both countries 
devoted great attention to this topic. Concerning the evolution of the Romanian banking system, the 
periodical publications of the central bank – The National Bank of Romania (NBR) – offer official data on the 
Romanian banking system. These publications include the Annual Reports and the Financial Stability 
Reports. The history of the Romanian banking system was presented in many studies like: Ionescu 
(coordinator, 1996); Kiritescu (1997); Mauri, Baicu (2002); Murgescu, Constantinescu (ed., 1960); Pintea, 
Ruşcanu (1995); Slăvescu (1925). The development of the Romanian banking system in recent years was 
highly debated in the specialty literature. To this regard the following studies could be mentioned: Zaman, 
Georgescu (2015); Zaman, Goschina (2015); Zaman (2013); Baicu, State (2012). The Central Bank of Iceland 
and the Financial Supervisory Authority of Iceland provide valuable information on the evolution of the 
Icelandic banking system. The specialty literature has paid great attention to the development of the 
Icelandic banking system in the pre-crisis period and the impact of the global financial crisis. In this regard, 
the following publications could be mentioned: Sigurjonsson (2010); Special Investigation Commission 
(2010, 2014); Halldorsson & Zoega (2010); Bagus & Howden (2009); Sigurjonsson & Mixa (2009); Mixa 
(2016). 
2. Romania and Iceland – Geographically and Historically Landmarks  
Romania is a country located in the Southeastern part of Central Europe, with an area of 238,391 sq. km 
(INS, 2015, p. 5). According to the latest census of population and housing in 2011, provided by the 
National Statistics Institute, on 20 October 2011, Romania had a stable population of 20,121,641 people 
(INS, 2011). On 1 January 2016, Bucharest - the capital of Romania - had a population of 2,106,144 people 
(INS, 2016). 
After the Second World War, Romania entered under the Soviet Union sphere of influence and the 
communist regime within the country was established. From the economic point of view, the communist 
regime involved implementation of the command economy, which included the abolition of private 
property and introduction of economic planning through development plans approved by the communist 
leadership. 
Due to the limitations of the communist regime that led to the sharp deterioration in living standards, 
the dictatorial regime of Nicolae Ceausescu, the Romania president at that time, was in 1989 removed.  
After 1990, democratic regime was established and the transition from the command economy to the 
market economy began. 
In 2007, Romania joined the European Union (EU). The accession process involved transposing the 
Community law into the Romanian legislation. 
Iceland is located in the northern part of the Atlantic Ocean, with an area of 103,000 sq. km, meaning 
that Iceland is a bit less than half of the size of Romania. While Romania has a population of around 20 
million people, Icelanders only count 340,000 people (Statistics Iceland, not dated). Compared to Romania, 
Iceland is much more rural. This is somewhat misleading because large parts of Iceland are not habitual 
since a large part of the country consists of mountains and glaciers. In the capital area of Iceland leave only 
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approximately 200,000 people, while Romania´s capital, Bucharest, inhabits about 10 times the amount of 
people. Iceland gained full independence from Denmark in 1944. The country is generally considered to be 
similar to other Nordic countries but still showing elements of American cultural values with a market 
economy but a strong emphasis on social benefits, mainly poverty alleviation (Olafsson, 2003).  
3. STRUCTURE of the FINANCIAL and BANKING SYSTEM in ROMANIA and ICELAND  
The evolution of the Romanian banking system has been influenced by a lot of factors where the 
political one played a decisive role. There are two distinct periods that were different in terms of 
organization and operation of the financial systems: the communist period and the period after 1990.  
The Icelandic financial system experienced a similar development, being prior to 1990s restricted in a 
politicalized environment, with banks mostly servicing certain groups. It began quickly transforming from 
the mid-1990s and growing massively during the Manic Millennium Years (Mixa, 2009). 
3.1. The Romanian financial and banking system prior to 1990 
The first bank that operated on the Romanian territory was Banca Naţională a Moldovei (The National 
Bank of Moldova), founded in 1856 (Ionescu coordinator, 1996, p. 18). The establishment of the public 
institutions - Casa de Depuneri şi Consemnaţiuni (The Deposits and Consignments House) in 1864 and Casa 
de Economii (The Savings House) in 1880 – marked a major stage for the Romanian banking system (Gusti, 
1943, p. 581-589).   
The issuing Bank of Romania - The National Bank of Romania (NBR) was established by the Law no. 
17/29 of April 1880 (Kiritescu, 1997, p. 304-305). The NBR played an important role in Romanian banking 
system creation and development. 
The number of banks grew rapidly: from 1, in 1874 to 222, in 1918 (Gusti, 1943, p. 561).  
The 1929-1933 crises had severe impact on the Romanian banking system. Prior to the crisis the 
number of banks increased and the banking system developed. However, the lack of maturity of the 
Romanian banking system and the undercapitalization of many banks caused many problems (Mauri and 
Baicu, 2002, p. 47-48). 
The transition towards the communist regime profoundly affected the Romanian banking system 
through the administrative measures taken in that era, among which very important were: 
- the passage of The National Bank of Romania as a state ownership - January 1st, 1947; 
- the establishment of the monobank system, involving the accumulating of banking operations 
within a single institution, which fulfilled both the functions of a central bank and commercial 
banks. This process involved the liquidation or dissolution of most commercial banks that existed in 
Romania prior to 1948; 
- restriction of foreign bank capital; with only four banks operating with foreign capital or joint 
capital (Romanian and foreign capital) in Romania (Chemical Bank, Société Générale, Banca Franco-
Română and Frankfurt Bucharest Bank). 
Another measure that was taken was the creation of some specialized banks to fund various economic 
sectors or to attract savings from the population: 
- Banca de Investiţii (The Investment Bank), specialized in investment finance; 
- Banca pentru Agricultură şi Industrie Alimentară (The Bank for Agriculture and Food Industry), 
specialized in financing the agricultural sector; 
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- Banca Română de Comerţ Exterior (The Romanian Bank for Foreign Trade), specialized in trade 
finance; 
- Casa de Economii şi Consemnaţiuni (The Savings House), detained monopoly in terms of savings 
from the population (Ionescu coordinator, 1996, p. 20-22). 
Stock exchange activity in Romania does not have a long tradition. The Bucharest Stock exchange was 
opened in December 1882, but at the first stage of functioning, the activity was reduced (Popa, 1993, p. 
259). During the communist regime, the stock exchange did not operate anymore. The political changes 
affecting Romania at end-1989 created the premises for capital market development. Therefore, The 
Bucharest Stock Exchange was re-established in 1995 (Anghelache, 2004, p. 25-29).  
3.2. The Romanian financial system after 1990 
After 1990, the Romanian banking system has been restructured and modernized. In the first stage of 
transition, the new legislative framework was adopted. The monobank system was abolished and the two-
tier banking system was implemented.  
As a result, during 1991-1998, the number of banks increased from 8 to 36 banks, of which 27 were 
Romanian legal entities, and 9 branches of foreign banks (the number of banks increased approximately 7 
times). Nevertheless, at end-1998, the Romania’s banking system was dominated by four banks with 
majority state capital (Bancorex, Banca Română de Dezvoltare, Banca Comercială Română, Banca Agricolă) 
that accounted for 62 percent of total banking assets. In addition, Casa de Economii şi Consemnaţiuni (CEC - 
The Savings House), entirely detained by the state, accounted for 9.8 percent of total banking assets (BNR, 
Rapoarte anuale 1996-2000, p. 297-298). 
Despite this progress, the Romanian banking system has faced many problems. Amid the disruptions at 
economic level that accompanied the transition process, the large state-owned banks lacked the 
experience and expertise within the new framework. The central bank in a similar manner also lacked 
experience in the supervision process during the early stages of transition. This led to some state-owned 
banks experiencing the problem of non-performing loans. 
Banca Agricola (The Agriculture Bank) and Bancorex were among the most affected banks. They had 
sectoral exposures towards enterprises in the energy sector and farming sector, respectively. At end-1998, 
the non-performing loans in the Romanian banking system accounted for more than 54 percent of total 
(NBR, Annual Report 1998, p. 78-79).  
In this context, the restructuring of state-owned banks began. In 1998, The Bank Asset Recovery 
Agency was established in order to take over the non-performing loans of state-owned banks to prepare 
the privatization process (Guvernul României, 1998).  
In 1999, Bancorex – the largest state-owned bank – was merged with Banca Comercială Română (The 
Romanian Commercial Bank). The cost the government bore of the restructuring of the Romanian banking 
sector accounted for 10 percent of GDP during 1990-2003(NBR, Financial Stability Report 2006, p. 49). 
The actions of restructuring state banks and the adoption of necessary legislative framework have laid 
the groundwork for starting the privatization of state banks, either by establishing new banks or having 
other banks entering the Romanian banking sector.  
The privatization of state owned banks began in 1999. This process has boosted the penetration of 
foreign capital in the Romanian banking system. Examples include the French bank Société Générale buying 
the majority stake of Banca Română de Dezvoltare (The Romanian Bank for Development) and Generale 
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Electric Capital Corporation and the Banco Portugues de Investimento buying the controlling stake in The 
Banc Post (BNR, Rapoarte anuale 1996-2000, p. 393-394). 
Therefore, at end-2000 foreign-owned banks held 50.88 percent of the domestic markets compared to 
the state-owned banks that held 46.1 percent (NBR, Annual report 2000, p. 99). 
In 2001 the privatization of Banca Agricola followed and the state equity holding was sold to a 
consortium made up of Raiffeisen Zentralbank Österreich A.G. (93.13 percent) and the Romanian-American 
Enterprise Fund (5.7 percent) (NBR, Annual Report 2001, p. 80). Banca Comercială Română was privatized 
and taken over by the Erste Bank (Austria) în 2006. 
Currently, the Romanian banking system is characterized by the dominant presence of foreign capital. 
At end-2015, credit institutions with a majority foreign capital (including branches of foreign credit 
institutions) detained 90.4 percent of aggregate net assets. Credit institutions with majority state-owned 
capital hold 8.3 percent of aggregate assets. Regarding the country of origin of foreign capital, the top-
three countries are: 
• Austria, 33.3 percent of net assets; 
• France, 13.5 percent of net assets; 
• Greece, 10.6 percent of net assets.  
At end-2015, there were 36 credit institutions, thereof 29 credit institutions Romanian legal entities and 
7 branches foreign credit institutions. Following the privatization process, only two fully or majority state-
owned capital credit institutions were still operating (NBR, Annual Report 2015, p. 93-94). 
The private pension funds in Romania are relatively new. They were introduced in 2008. By 
comparison, the private pension system (the mandatory private pensions) was introduced in Hungary in 
1998, in Poland in 1999, in Lithuania in 2004, in the Slovak Republic in 2005 (The World Bank, 2013, p. 4). 
Currently, the insurance and private pension system are regulated and supervised by the Financial 
Supervisory Authority. This authority was established to integrate supervision of non-bank financial 
markets (with exception of non-bank financial institutions) in order to increase the efficiency of the 
financial supervision (Guvernul României, 2012).  
The shadow banking sector in Romania is not well represented compared to some developed countries. 
Shadow banking sector accounts for 15.5 percent of total financial assets and includes non-banks financial 
institutions, investment funds and money-market funds (NBR, Financial stability report 2015, p. 105). Both 
non-banks financial institutions and investment funds are regulated and supervised: non-banks financial 
institutions are regulated and supervised by the National Bank of Romania and investment funds, by the 
Financial Supervisory Authority.  
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3.3. The impact of the global financial crisis on the Romanian banking system 
The Romanian banking system was severely affected by the global financial crisis despite the business 
model adopted by the Romanian banks being the traditional one:    
- unlike other banking systems, the balance sheets of the Romanian banks did not contain “toxic” 
assets; 
- the shadow banking in the Romanian system was not well represented; 
- securitization was not used in the Romanian banking system; 
- the most important liabilities of the Romanian banking system were the traditional deposits from 
non-bank sector (in 2007, non-bank sector deposits accounted for 52.6 percent of total liabilities - 
see table 1); 
- different bonuses in the remuneration system did not play a significant role in the Romanian 
banking system compared to developed countries (for more details see Baicu and State, 2012).  
Besides, after triggering the crisis, unlike other countries, the Romanian state did not allocate funds to 
capitalize banks.      
Despite these differences, in some aspects, the behavior of the Romanian banks in the pre-crisis period 
was similar to the behavior of banks in other countries. The expansion of the credit activity is one example. 
In order to improve their profitability, many banks relaxed the credit conditions that profoundly affected 
the quality of credit portfolios once the crisis hit international markets.    
Remuneration based on short-term results was also present in the Romanian banking system with a 
negative impact on the quality assets on medium and long term, as also strongly noticed after the 
triggering of the global crisis.  
Other characteristic of the Romanian banking system that could be included in the pre-crisis global 
trends was financing the credit expansion in great part through wholesale market, namely through funding 
received from parent banks in origin countries. Therefore, foreign liabilities grew from 15.9 percent in 2004 
to 31.7 percent in November 2008 (see table 1). 
Nevertheless, in a global world, the Romanian banking system could not be immune to the crisis that 
propagated in Romania latter. The global crisis affected the Romanian banking system in multiple ways and 
foreign banks played an important role in crisis propagation.  
Against the immediate liquidity problem at an international level and the pressure to meet the level of 
capital adequacy according to the new regulatory framework, parent banks diminished the funding of their 
subsidiaries in Romania. In this context, foreign liabilities of credit institutions operating in Romania 
decreased gradually from 31.7 percent of total liabilities in November 2008 (NBR, Financial Stability Report 
2009, p. 22) to 15.5 percent of the balance sheet in December 2015 (NBR, Financial Stability Report April 
2016, p. 48), meaning that this percentage went down by half. The diminishing of credit lines from parent 
banks was offset by the increase of private sector deposits – which were 60.8 percent of bank liabilities in 
December 2015 (NBR, Financial Stability Report April 2016, p. 48).   
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Table 1 Liability structure of credit institutions operating in Romania 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: NBR, Financial Stability Report 2009, p. 22. 
A characteristic of Romania is the low level of financial intermediation with the share of bank assets 
being 56.0 percent of GDP in September 2016 compared to 66.0 percent of GDP in December 2008 (NBR, 
Financial Stability Report December 2016, p. 53).  
Currently,  one  of  the  most  important  vulnerability  of  the  Romanian  banking  system  is the  high  
non-performing loan ratio. According to the NBR Financial Stability Report December 2016 (p. 57-58), the 
non-performing loan ratio reached 10 percent (September 2016), which is well above the EU average (5.5 
percent, June 2016). However, due to the balance sheet clean-up process, the non-performing loan ratio 
decreased from 22.0 percent, as was in December 2012 (NBR, Financial Stability Report 2013, p. 54). This 
high level of non-performing loan ratio is a direct consequence of the aggressive and unsustainable lending 
policy promoted in the pre-crisis period.  
Despite the issue of non-performing loans, other prudential indicators have comfortable levels. For 
example, the Romanian banking system is characterized by high level of capital adequacy indicators (the 
total capital ratio accounted for 18.8 percent in September 2016 – NBR, Financial Stability Report 
December 2016, p. 67). In line with the European and international tendency, after the global crisis, the 
banking regulatory framework has been improved in Romania too. 
3.4. The Icelandic financial system prior to the 1990 
The Icelandic banking system was practically non-existent before 1885 when The National Bank of 
Iceland was established by the government following Iceland´s financial independence from Denmark 10 
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years earlier. Savings banks were established during the same period (Jonsson G., 2004). Danish business 
persons established another bank in 1904 named Islandsbanki (Jonsson A., 2009). The Icelandic 
government established the Agricultural bank in 1929 (Jonsson G., 2004) and the following year, during the 
start of the Great Depression, Islandsbanki became bankrupt, with the government establishing from its 
ruins another bank specifically aiming at servicing another sector, called The Bank of Iceland´s Fisheries 
(Agnarsson, 2004). While serving those specific groups, these moves were viewed as being part of 
transferring Iceland as a modern and independent nation, which up to that point was almost entirely 
dependent on agriculture (Finsen & Skulason, 1938; Jonsson G., 1995).  
This trend of servicing special interest groups of borrowers continued during the next decades. Specific 
interest groups began establishing banks that reflected the name of the groups they mainly served 
(Johannesson, S. 2004). Examples include The Industrial Bank (1953), The Icelandic Bank of Commerce 
(1963) and The People´s Bank (1971), which was some sort of a union bank (Jonsson A., 2009). All of these 
three banks merged with the Bank of Fisheries in 1989, with the new bank re-named the old familiar name 
of Islandsbanki. During the period from 1930 until 1990s, the Icelandic banking environment can be 
characterized as being restrictive, with capital controls in full effect where political connections and 
governmental policies, in a similar manner as other Nordic banking systems during most of that era 
dictated the allocation to industries. The government did not own the smaller but the interest groups that 
owned them all had strong political ties. 
Real interest rates were often negative, meaning that access to money was an asset in itself, with 
demand constantly higher than supply, meaning that such allocation could easily be described as 
preferential treatment (Sigurjonsson & Mixa, 2011; Jonung, 2008; Englund, 1999). Foreign currency 
restrictions were the norm in Iceland, with special permissions needed for foreign currency to import, 
invest or even to cover travelling expenses.  
3.5. The Icelandic financial system after 1990 
While the Icelandic financial system began transforming rapidly during the 1990s, signs of changes had 
begun a few years earlier. This included the establishment of a stock exchange in 1985, which was little 
used the first years of operations, and the liberalization of domestic bank rates in 1985 that became fully 
liberalized in 1987.  
This slow process towards a more market oriented banking system took a major turn in 1994 when 
Iceland joined the European Economic Area (EEA), opening the doors to the free flow of capital and hence 
foreign direct investment. Iceland was, in effect, forced to follow the parameters of the EEA agreement 
(Sigurjonsson & Mixa, 2011), abolishing currency restrictions and connecting the country’s economy in a 
global manner, leading to restrictions on capital movements being fully abolished the year after. This also 
opened the door to financial liberalization that had not been in effect since the fall of Islandsbanki (the first 
version, not the re-named bank) in 1930. These changes aimed at making the Icelandic banking system 
more efficient, for it was generally accepted that had been bloated and inefficient for many years. Capital 
movements increased even more and efficiently with the creation of the Interbank Money Market in 1998 
followed by the Interbank FX Swap Market in 2002 (Central Bank of Iceland, 2006).   
Iceland followed the trend in international banking with added liberalization, meaning that the 
differences between traditional banking and investment banking became ever less clear. Services related to 
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brokerage and investment bank services quickly spread within the industry. Mutual funds, trading for 
customers and on behalf of the banks became common features of all banks within the 1995-2000 period.  
By 2002 the Icelandic banking system was operating mostly as a completely modernized system with 
the Financial Supervisory Authority though still catching up to the new environment. Simple regulatory 
functions such as the separation of bankers dealing with the bank’s proprietary investments and 
investments on behalf of their clients had only been enacted 2002 (Financial Supervisory Authority of 
Iceland, 2002) with further separation between the operation of banks and mutual funds enacted in 2003 
(Financial Supervisory Authority of Iceland, 2003). Although some concerns were already being raised 
regarding the increase in lending (Morgunbladid, 2004; Central Bank of Iceland, 2004), such concerns were 
(still) shrugged off due to the restrictive lending practices that had been common place for such a long 
time, causing a pent up demand for such loans.   
A privatization process, started in 1992, began to affect the banking system in 1997 and went into full 
steam 2002 when the government wholly privatized 2 of the 3 main Icelandic major banks. Islandsbanki 
had risen from the ashes of the combined fragile banks in the early 1990s and in 2000 was merged with an 
investment bank that had been privatized by the government 2 years earlier. The other two banks, The 
National Bank of Iceland and The Agricultural Bank were initially partially privatized in 1998, with a large 
amount of people investing in them. A controlling stake in The National Bank of Iceland was bought by 
business tycoons that had no prior experience in banking (Sigurjonsson, 2010) while The Agricultural Bank 
was overtaken by Kaupthing Bank, an investment bank that The Agricultural Bank ironically owned a 50% 
stake in until 1996 (Special Investigation Commission, 2014). This development can be seen in table 2. 
Table 2 Financial Evolution in Iceland 
Event Year 
Financial Indexation permitted 1979 
Liberalization of domestic bank rates 1984-1986 
Iceland Stock Exchange established 1985 
Interest Rate Act: Interest rates fully liberalized 1987 
Stepwise liberalization of capital movement begins 1990 
Treasury overdraft facility in the Central Bank closed 1992-1993 
New foreign exchange regulations marks the beginning of the liberalization of 
cross-border capital movements  
1992 
Privatization process launched 1992 
Interbank market for foreign exchange established 1993 
Iceland becomes a founding member of the EEA 1994 
Long term capital movements fully liberalized 1994 
Short term capital movements fully liberalized 1995 
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Foreign direct investment liberalized in accordance with EEA agreement 1995 
Privatization process of the Icelandic banks begins 1998 
Interbank money market 1998 
Interbank FX swap market 2001 
Privatization of state owned banks completed 2003 
Source: Central Bank of Iceland, 2006 and Sigurjónsson & Mixa, 2011. 
Following the privatization of the Icelandic public banks in 2002, they multiplied their size by capitalized 
money market funding, which included opening branches abroad and acquiring foreign financial institutions 
in large numbers (Sigurjonsson, 2010). While an explanation of such concerns at that time could have been 
explained by years of restrictive banking, as can be seen in figure 1, the total assets of the Icelandic banking 
system continued to increase rapidly, way beyond what a prior restrictive banking environment could 
explain away. 
Figure 1 Total Assets of Iceland´s 3 Main Banks and the Savings Banks System 
 
Source: Annual Reports of Iceland´s 3 main banks, Kaupthing bank, Islandsbanki and Landsbankinn, Special 
Investigation Commission (2014) and calculations done by the authors 
The combined total assets of Iceland´s main three banks were less than Iceland´s GDP in 1999. The total 
assets had gone a long way to three times the GDP in 2003 when concerns of overheating in lending were 
beginning to be heard. That was, however, just beginning. The combined balance sheets of the banking 
system, which was approximately the same as the amount of Iceland’s gross domestic product (GDP) in a 
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single year around the 2000, had grown to around 7-8 times that figure in 2007 (Halldorsson & Zoega, 
2010).   
By swelling the total assets of the Icelandic banking and putting a more emphasis on investment 
banking, profits in the friendly investment banking environment in the world were in few places as 
apparent as in Iceland. Figure 2 shows the increase in equity and profits, using 1 as the base point in 1999. 
 
Figure 2 The Increase in Equity and Profits of the Icelandic Banking System 1999-2007, using 1999 as a 
starting point 
 
Source: Annual Reports of Iceland´s 3 main banks, Kaupthing bank, Islandsbanki and Landsbanki, Special 
Investigation Commission (2014) and calculations done by the authors 
As figure 2 shows, the profits began in earnest swelling and equity increasing in 2003 and onwards. This 
was not a coincidence. The privatization of the Icelandic banking system was concluded those years. While 
the overvaluation of technology stocks leading to great losses, events like 9/11 and the bankruptcy of major 
companies like WorldCom and Enron had had very negative effects on financial markets, the Icelandic 
banking system rode the tails of fantastic years in the stock market the following years more than 
practically any banking system in the world. 
This rapid growth of the Icelandic banking system opened doors to risky loans and financing methods. 
The Icelandic banks had financed their obligations on a very short-term basis, for example through newly 
formed subsidiary Internet banks. Debt, mainly short-term debt maturing in three to five years, had 
increased a great deal during the years of expansion (Special Investigation Commission, 2010, 3). This was 
the means to finance the rapid speed of expansion following the privatization of the 3 main banks. Bagus & 
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Howden (2009) maintain that this made them more vulnerable to the liquidity crisis during the 2007-2009 
period, resulting in Iceland´s 3 main banks’ failure to refinance their short-term debt following a run on 
deposits in the UK and Netherlands. 
The fall of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 demonstrated that a large financial firm could go 
bankrupt without nation state assistance. With international money markets completely frozen, liquid 
resources vanished and assets became untradeable. A bank run began on the complete Icelandic financial 
system. The government took over Glitnir bank´s operations on October 6. Due in part to the 
interconnectedness of the Icelandic banking system, both Landsbanki and Kaupthing bank followed in the 
following days. 
The losses were enormous. The Icelandic economy went into a tailspin with a combination of the 
Icelandic krona losing half of its value (Central Bank of Iceland database, not dated), the stock market 
practically losing all of its value and the pension fund system losing around 25% of its assets (Icelandic 
Pension Funds Association, 2012). Many Icelanders lost their homes, jobs and security with unemployment 
reaching levels not seen in decades (Sigurjonsson & Mixa, 2011). While the Icelandic nation lost a great 
deal, it could have been worse. The credit losses were unheard of, with foreigners losing what amounted to 
two times the amount of Iceland´s entire real estate value (Mixa, 2011), with the Icelandic banks combined 
losses only less than Lehman Brothers when it comes to credit default the entire 1920-2008 period 
(Moodys, 2009).  
While those losses were enormous, the Icelandic government has managed to re-build the banking 
system. New banks were formed with the assets from the old banks transferred to newly established banks. 
Arion bank was formed with the Icelandic government owning 13% of the bank, Islandsbanki became 
wholly owned by the Icelandic government in 2015 following negotiations with creditors (Ministry of 
Finance and Economic Affairs, 2017b) with Landsbanki also wholly owned by the Icelandic government in 
2009.    
Laws and regulations have been tightened. A major issue revolves around the “Too Big to Fail” concept, 
i.e., banks that entail systematic financial risks. During the 2008 financial crisis, it became obvious how 
intertwined the Icelandic banks were with each other and how their operations affected the Icelandic 
economy and hence society. With this in mind, the minimum equity ratio for the three big commercial 
banks rose from 8% (Financial Supervisory Authority of Iceland, 2014) to 16.5%; with banks that may pose 
systematic financial risks having an additional 2% combined capital buffer compared to other less 
systematically important banks (Financial Supervisory Authority of Iceland, 2016). This was done to ensure 
that the Icelandic banking system is more immune towards domino effects during a banking crisis. Icelandic 
banks have been responding to this scenario. By looking at the ratio of equity against total liabilities, the 
ratio has been increasing in recent years, although in small degrees.  
When one looks at the equity ratio, i.e., the amount of equity compared to total assets, one can see 
that it is relatively high. While total assets have increased around 14% during the last five years, the equity 
  
(online) = ISSN 2285 – 3642 
ISSN-L = 2285 – 3642 
Journal of Economic Development, Environment and People 
Volume 6, Issue 2, 2017 
 
URL: http://jedep.spiruharet.ro 
e-mail: office_jedep@spiruharet.ro 
 
 
 
of banks has increased 27% during the same period. Looking at the equity/total assets ratio, the banks are 
less leveraged now than they used to be shortly after the crisis.  
Table 3 The Combined, Assets, Equity and Equity/Assets ratios of the Three Main Icelandic Banks 
Icelandic krona M 2016 2015 2014 2013 2012
Total Equity 641.556 668.658 598.490 553.577 503.726 
Total Assets 3.194.711 3.175.427 2.943.398 2.956.425 2.808.862 
Equity/Assets ratio 20% 21% 20% 19% 18%  
Source: 2016 Annual Reports of Arion Bank, Landsbanki and Islandsbanki (2017) 
This may be surprising since the stableness of the Icelandic banking system has increased a great deal. 
While the ratio of non performing loans was high following the crash, it has for example gone from 31.4% 
at Landsbanki in 2012 down to only 2.4% in 2016 (Landsbanki, 2017). The same bank, actually the whole 
Icelandic banking system, had for a short while a rating of AAA in 2007, but even at that time was 
controversial (Globe and Mail, 2007). Following the crash, Landsbanki received a junk-bond rating of BB+, 
which could be considered being a speculative investment grade, but has now followed in the footsteps of 
the Icelandic government by having better investment ratings, which is today up to BBB, which is an 
investment grade rating.  
Iceland´s GDP in 2016 was approximately 2,400,000M Icelandic krona (Statistics Iceland, not dated) 
which means that the total assets of the Icelandic banks compared to Iceland´s GDP is slightly higher than 
1.2 fold. The main systematic risk for the Icelandic government has today more relevance due to its 
ownership in the banks, which price-to-book value today is close to 500,000M Icelandic krona, or over 20% 
of Iceland´s GDP (Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs, 2017b; Landsbanki, 2017; Arion bank, 2017; 
Islandsbanki, 2017; Statistics Iceland, not dated & authors´ calculations). If the Icelandic banking system 
would suffer another crisis, there would be a double blow, with both an economic crisis and taxpayers at 
the same time, possibly having to finance a crumbling banking system. 
There is thus a great deal of talk of making the Icelandic banking system smaller, possibly selling part of 
Iceland´s ownership back to private investors with the current government looking into possibilities of 
selling its stake in the Icelandic banks. Doing that would, however, take many years using merely the 
domestic market. Also, many people oppose such a sale, pointing out how badly the former privatization 
ended. There is also much talk about separating the investment side of banking and commercial banking. It 
has actually become an annual theme in Parliament to introduce legislation to separate such units, with 
many pointing out the inherent dangers of allowing banks to participate in investment banking backed with 
government assistance in the form of for example deposit insurance (Mixa, 2015). It does not mean that 
banking can be safe simply by concentrating on commercial banking (Admati & Hellwig, 2013) but the risk 
level of banking does without doubt increase once banks are allowed into the investment-banking arena. 
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4. Discussions on Comparative Study of the Romanian and Icelandic Banking 
Systems 
4.1. Similarities between the two banking systems 
If we are looking superficial, Romania and Iceland might seem to have witnessed a development of very 
different banking systems. A closer inspection, however, reveals many similarities.  
Both banking systems were characterized by late development. In Romania, the bank that issues 
currency – The National Bank of Romania - was founded in 1880, only five years before The National Bank 
Iceland, founded in 1885. Also, the savings banks were established in the two countries in about the same 
period of time. Both in Romania and Iceland, foreigners have contributed to the creation and development 
of banking systems. One can mention Danish traders in Iceland or French and German capital in Romania 
(see Murgescu, Constantinescu ed., 1960) and also those Icelandic banks were to a great extent funded 
through European banks during the 1999-2008 period. 
Prior to the 1990s, both countries had banking systems dominated by politics. In Romania, the 
Communist party controlled the system centrally. In Iceland, the political ties concealed to some extent 
that while different banks existed, those banks were mostly tools for pressure groups to gain access to 
money, which often was to some extent free due to negative interest rates. It can thus be said that both 
countries only started during the 1990s to develop banking systems that can be described in varying 
portions as modernized.  
A common feature of both banking systems prior to the 1990s was the presence of specialized banks. 
The names of these banks reflected the sector they served. There were the following specialized banks in 
Romania:  
- Banca de Investiţii (The Investment Bank);  
- Banca pentru Agricultură şi Industria Alimentară (The Bank for Agriculture and Food Industry);  
- Banca Română de Comerţ Exterior (The Romanian Bank for Foreign Trade);  
- Casa de Economii şi Consemnaţiuni (The Savings House). 
The specialized banks that operated in Iceland: 
      - The Industrial Bank; 
      - The Icelandic Bank of Commerce; 
      - The Bank of Fisheries. 
As one can notice, the names of these specialized banks in both countries were similar, the sectors 
served by specialize banks being the same (commerce, industry, agriculture).    
In Romania, the liberalization of banking and capital began after 1990. There were few banks at the 
beginning of the transition process towards the market economy. In a similar fashion, the liberalization of 
capital began for real in Iceland after 1995.  
The accession to the European Union, respectively the European Economic Area, played an important 
role for internationalization of both Romania and Iceland. The Agreement for Romania’s Association to the 
EU was signed in 1993 and the official application for EU membership was presented in 1995. Romania 
joined the EU in 2007 (Ministerul Afacerilor Externe, Chronology of Romania-EU relations, available at 
https://www.mae.ro/sites/default/files/file/userfiles/file/pdf/chronology_romania_ue.pdf). To this end, 
the Romanian legislation has been aligned with the EU legislation by adopting the acquis communautaire. 
Iceland joined the European Economic Area in 1995. 
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Other similarities regarding the privatization process of banking system. Until privatization process 
began, there were big state Romanian banks without experience and expertise in “new” banking. The first 
state owned bank was privatized in 1999. Subsequently, the privatization of Banca Comercială Română in 
2006 almost completed the privatization process of the Romanian banking system. In Iceland, the bank 
privatization was realized during 1998-2002. Like the banks in Romania, prior to the privatization process, 
Icelandic banks had also almost no experience and definitely no knowledge to handle any financial crisis 
following such rapid expansion.  
In the pre-crisis period, both banking systems expanded activity. The expansion of credit activity in both 
countries occurred after periods of restrictive banking. The global financial crisis greatly affected both 
banking systems, even if the business model developed by banks in the two countries were different. 
Nevertheless, during the pre-crisis period, banks in both countries expanded rapidly that yielded short-term 
profits without taking into considerations the impact on long term situations.  
The global financial crisis greatly affected the two banking systems and consequently both countries 
have taken measures to improve the banking regulatory framework, in line with the regulatory 
developments at the international level.   
 
4.2. Differences between the two banking systems in recent years 
In the pre-crisis period, the Romanian banks developed the traditional business model. The balance 
sheets of the Romanian banks did not contain “toxic” assets. Securitization was not used and the shadow 
banking system was not well represented. After the crisis, the Romanian state did not allocate funds to 
capitalize banks. On the other hand, in Iceland investment banking expanded rapidly within the banks. 
Following the privatization process, the inflow of money for the Romanian banking system came almost 
entirely from abroad but the banking system in Iceland was to the most extent financed with domestic 
ownership that relied on a great degree on foreign loans.1  
This had positive effects on the Romanian banking system in regards to experience in banking and 
increase competition. There is, however, a downside. Foreign owners of the banks have been reluctant to 
write off bad loans or face in any meaningful way the non performing loans, which are still so high. Besides, 
a potential disadvantage of a massive foreign capital contribution in a banking system is the possibility to 
withdraw rapidly from the local market, with negative effects on the financial system and national 
economy. In this respect, very important to prevent the withdrawal in disordered manner of cross-border 
banks groups from both Romania and other countries in Central and Eastern Europe was the Vienna 
initiative launched in 2009 (see ECBI, Vienna Initiative 1.0 – Overview, available at http://vienna-
initiative.com/vienna-initiative-part-1/overview/).  
Apart the uncertainty related to ceasing operating in Romania, Zaman (2013) underlines the fact that 
the subsidiaries of foreign banks in Romania pursued firstly the parent-banks interests and then the 
interests of the Romanian economy. 
While the Icelandic government was (rightly) criticized for its reluctance in having foreigners invest in 
its banking system, meaning that instead they were financed more by foreign creditors, it was easier for the 
                                                            
1
 The financing is beyond of this paper but much of the financing of the Icelandic banking system appears to have been 
through investment schemes in which money was basically printed by banks and some of their best business partners. 
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Icelandic government to take over the operations of those banks, with foreign creditors picking up most of 
the losses during the financial crisis. This has enabled the Icelandic banking system to work with creditors in 
re-scheduling their debt payment plans and, as the example of Landsbanki shows, the non performing loans 
have gone down to very low levels.2  
Due to the limited possibilities to develop at an internal level (as we mentioned, Icelanders only count 
340,000 people) and eager to generate profits, the Icelandic banks choose to expand oversee and opened 
offices abroad. Instead, in Romania, foreign banks opened subsidiaries and branches to exploit the growth 
potential and lack of experience of this market with about 20 million people.  
Following a similar discussion regarding the source of money, the ownership nationality shows that 
problems can emerge regarding agency issues. In Iceland, the domestic owners of banks were accused of 
various sorts of crony capitalism (Special Investigation Commission, 2010). Such practices utilized, for 
example, nationalistic themes to have the Icelandic nation accept the risky behavior of the banks´ 
expansion and their rapid growth, which had to entail some risks (Loftsdottir & Mixa, 2014). While many 
deemed such behavior as reckless and even stupid, the (domestic) owners of those banks might have had 
an incentive to take those risks because they did pocket (very) large bonuses while the going was good 
(Mixa, 2016). While such ownership contributed to the reckless behavior, it also enabled the Icelandic 
government to tackle the situation much better. After agreements with foreign creditors in 2015, it has 
even been suggested that the financial (not emotional) damaged from the 2008 crisis by the government 
has been retrieved (Jonsson & Sigurgeirsson, 2016). 
This was the reverse situation in Romania. While foreign owners were maybe more prudent in their 
practices, their investments in Romania have been kept to a minimum and the government has limited 
powers to re-store the banking system in a manner that it begins lending again and thus bringing the 
Romanian economic growth back on a path of economic growth. 
Therefore, due to the vulnerabilities the subsidiaries of foreign banks pose to the Romanian economy, 
especially in the crisis period, Zaman (2013) considers that a priority of Romania is the development of a 
banking system with domestic capital to finance the national economy in a sustainable way.   
 
5. Conclusions  
The comparative analysis of the Romanian and Icelandic banking systems reveals, surprisingly, a 
multitude of similarities in terms of historical evolution, despite the fact that between the two countries 
were big differences from many points of view - economic, political or social. Even geographically, the two 
countries are located at great distance, with large differences regarding the number of inhabitants. 
However, both banking systems began to develop relatively late in the second half of the nineteenth 
century, with foreign capital playing an important role. The crisis of 1929-1933 affected both banking 
systems.  
After the Second World War, Romania came under Soviet influence and the monobank system was 
implemented. Even though Iceland did not have the same political evolution, the Icelandic banking system 
was until the 1990s subject to restrictive controls, with the political factor also playing an important role. 
                                                            
2
 The tourist industry boom in Iceland that began in 2010 has also had a great effect in assisting people finding new 
jobs, making Iceland´s GDP growth among the highest in the world in recent years. 
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After 1990, both banking systems began the process liberalization. Romania's accession to the EU and 
Iceland’s accession to the EEA have been key moments in the development of the two banking systems. 
In the late 1990s and early 2000s, the two banking systems were subjected to the privatization process. 
A notable difference between the two banking systems is the buyers’ country of origin for the privatized 
banks. Foreign capital dominates the Romanian banking system, while in Iceland foreign capital financed 
the rapid growth to a large degree but the ownership was mostly domestic. 
In the pre-crisis period, both banking systems expanded activity. The global financial crisis greatly 
impacted both banking system, despite the business models developed by banks in the two countries were 
different.  
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